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NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS AND JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from the final Judgment, Sentence and Commitment entered by 
the Honorable J. Philip Eves of the Utah Fifth Judicial District Court, Beaver County, on 
January 19, 2000, which was based upon Defendant's conviction of attempted assault by 
a prisoner, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-102 and 76-4-
101. 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Const. Art. I, § 12, as well as Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) and Utah R. Crim. P. 4(a). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court judge committed an abuse of discretion by ordering that 
restitution be paid within six months of the date of sentencing rather than six months 
from the date of Defendant's release? 
A trial court's determination of restitution at a criminal sentencing is reviewed on an 
"abuse of discretion" standard. See State v. Schweitzer. 943 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah App. 1997). 
Cf. Utah Code Ann § 76-3-20l(4)(a)(i). 
2. Whether the trial court judge committed an abuse of discretion by sentencing 
Defendant to serve a jail term to run consecutive to his present prison term? 
A trial court's decision to order a concurrent rather than a consecutive sentence is 
reviewed on an "abuse of discretion" standard. See State v. Schweitzer. 943 P.2d 649, 651 
(Utah App. 1997). Cf., Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401. 
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STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
This appeal involves the following statutes, which are reproduced in the addendum: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4)(a)(i). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE & FACTS RELEVANT TO REVIEW 
On December 8, 1999, Defendant Bobby Hodges appeared before Judge J. Philip 
Eves of the Utah Fifth District Court for the purpose of entering a change of plea, 
pursuant to a plea agreement reach with the State of Utah in which the State "agree[d] to 
file an amended information charging attempted assault by a prisoner, a Class A 
Misdemeanor, and the defendant agree[d] to plead guilty to that charge.. . . and pay 
restitution in the amount to be determined by the court" (C.P. Tr. at 1-3, 6-7).l 
After accepting the entry of Defendant's plea, the Court next addressed the issue 
of sentencing and whether a presentence investigation should be undertaken in the case, 
and asked Defendant whether he "understood] what a presentence investigation is." (C.P. 
Tr.atl3). 
The Defendant responded, "Yes. But I have no problem paying on the restitution 
once I get off. I'm able to pay it, but not until then, because I have no accesses of getting 
to my money from here" (C.P. Tr. at 13-14). 
After further questioning from the Court, Defendant subsequently agreed that a 
presentence investigation should be done, and a sentencing date was set (C.P. Tr. at 14). 
,MC.P. Tr." refers to the transcript of the Change of Plea dated December 8, 1999. 
The pagination of the volume is cited separately from the trial record, and separately from 
the transcript of the January 19, 2000 Sentencing. 
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At the subsequent January 19, 2000 sentencing, evidence contained in the 
presentence investigation was reviewed to collaborate Defendant's role in the jail 
altercation, for the purpose of persuading the Court to order that Defendant be required to 
pay only $10,000 of the $20,658.17 restitution amount, or his "fair share" (S. Tr. at 9-
10).2 
After conceding that "Mr. Hodges doesn't have a very big ability to pay restitution 
while he's incarcerated," and suggesting that the payment of restitution "be attached to 
his parole when he gets out on parole," the State agreed to join in the recommendation 
that restitution be set at less than the full amount if payment could be based on some kind 
of"structure"(S. Tr. at 13). 
Inquiring of the Defendant regarding "what kind of structure" he would propose, 
the Court asked the Defendant "when would the $10,000 be paid?" (S. Tr. at 13). 
Defendant, who had previously indicated that the funds could be collected "from 
family members and from friends" in exchange for work which he would do for them 
after his release "in the near future," indicated that "the full $10,000 could be paid within 
six months," meaning six months from the date of release (S. Tr. at 9, 13). 
In addition to hearing Defendant's statements regarding restitution, in addressing 
the issue of Defendant's jail term the trial court also heard statements from Defendant 
regarding his culpability as a participant in the prison assault, and regarding the recent 
2,fS. Tr." refers to the transcript of the Sentencing dated January 19, 2000. The 
volume is paginated separately from the trial record, and separately from the transcript of 
the December 8, 1999 Change of Plea. 
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emergence of new witnesses who were willing to present testimony on his behalf at 
sentencing. Commenting on the belated decision of the other inmates to come forward on 
his behalf, the Court stated, "Sure would have been a lot more simple if they would have 
said that in the first place, hu?" (S. Tr. at 14). The Court then further remarked: 
Well, if you'll pardon a little digression . . . that's one of the problems with those that 
you are doing time with, is that they don't understand the rules that make[] society 
operate. If they had come forward in the first place, you might not even be standing 
there convicted. But because they honored this code of silence, you are now 
suffering the consequences. 
(S. Tr. at 15). Defendant was subsequently sentenced to serve "a year in the county jail, 
consecutive to the term that [he] is currently serving," and ordered to pay "$10,000 
restitution within the next six months," or the "entire amount of restitution upon his release" 
if the $10,000 is not paid in six months of sentencing (S. Tr. at 15-16). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The trial court acted with inherent unfairness by rashly disregarding Defendant's 
statements concerning his ability to pay restitution while incarcerated, by treating Defendant 
worse than it would have treated a non-prisoner facing similar assault charges, and by 
treating Defendant with hostility in its candor toward him. 
2. By disregarding Defendant's statements concerning his ability to pay restitution 
while incarcerated, the trial court adopted a view that no reasonable person would take. 
3. Rather than considering legally relevant and proper factors such as the 
circumstances surrounding the offense and Defendant's rehabilitative needs, the trial court 
appears to have base its concurrent sentence upon Defendant's status as a State prison 
inmate. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT JUDGE COMMITTED AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
BY ORDERING THAT REDUCED RESTITUTION BE PAID WITHIN SIX 
MONTHS OF THE DATE OF SENTENCING RATHER THAN SIX 
MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF DEFENDANT'S RELEASE. 
As outlined in State v. Schweitzer. 943 P.2d 649 (Utah App. 1997)[hereinafter 
Schweitzer]. "[t]he imposition of a sentence 'rests entirely within the discretion of the 
[trial] court, within the limits prescribed by law.'" Id. at 651 (citing State v. Peterson. 681 
P.2d 1210, 1219 (Utah 1984)[hereinafter Peterson). As a result, an appeals court must 
"'review the sentencing decisions of a trial court for abuse of discretion."5 id. (citing 
State v. Houk. 906 P.2d 907, 909 (Utah App. 1995)[hereinafter Houk]). Furthermore, 
"Abuse of discretion may be manifest if the actions of the judge in sentencing were 
inherently unfair' or if the judge imposed a 'clearly excessive sentence."' Id. What's 
more, an Appeals Court "may find an abuse of discretion only if [it] conclude[s] that 'no 
reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial court.'" id. (citing State v. 
Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978)). Decisions regarding such orders of restitution 
made at sentencing are governed by Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(4)(a)(i). 
The Defense now considers the factors of inherent fairness and reasonableness in 
analyzing the "structure" of restitution payments ordered by the trial court at sentencing 
(S.Tr. at 13). 
A. The actions of the trial court jindge at sentencing were inherently unfair. 
A trial court's sentencing decision can be considered "inherently unfair" if the 
judge treats the Defendant "worse than other defendants," if the decision was made 
"rashly," or if the decision was made with "hostility." Cf. Houk, supra, 906 P.2d at 909. 
In the present case, the facts indicate that the sentence imposed by the court was 
made "rashly." Id. Despite the trial court's finding "that the defendant does not have the 
current ability to pay [restitution], at least, not while he's in custody," the trial court 
nonetheless ordered that if "Defendant pays $10,000 restitution within the next six 
months, that he will not need to pay the remainder of the restitution." (S. Tr. at 15). 
Although the reduction of the restitution amount was indeed in keeping with Defendant's 
request that restitution be lowered, the "schedule" of payment imposed by the court for 
payment of the $10,000 "within the next six months" clearly was not in keeping with 
Defendant's assertion that despite the help of "family members and from friends" in 
gathering the money together "in the very near future"(S. Tr. at 15, 9-10), he nonetheless 
would only be able to gather the money from these people "once I get off (C.P. Tr. at 
13-14). Specifically, Defendant informed the trial court, "I'm able to pay it, but not until 
then, because I have no accesses of getting to my money from here" (C.P. Tr. at 13-14). 
By failing to take cognizance of these representations, or by choosing to disregard them 
entirely, the Court acted in a "reckless" and "hasty" fashion. See Webster's New World 
Compact School and Office Dictionary 355 (1989)(defining the term 
"rashly")[hereinafter Webster's Dictionary]. 
The facts of the present case also indicate that in imposing its sentence, the trial 
court treated Defendant "worse than other defendants" because of his status as a jail 
inmate. Cf. Houk, supra, 906 P.2d at 909. It is apparent that the trial court conditioned 
the lowering of restitution upon conditions which it believed the Defendant could not 
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meet. As mentioned above, the Court found "'that the defendant does not have the current 
ability to pay [restitution], at least, not while he's in custody" (S. Tr. at 15). It is also 
apparent that the decision to limit the reduction in restitution to the period of Defendant's 
incarceration was based upon Defendant's status as a prison inmate (S. Tr. At 15). In 
addition, as outlined above, the trial court further stated: 
Well, if you'll pardon a little digression . . . that's one of the problems with those 
that you are doing time with, is that they don't understand the rules that make[] 
society operate. If they had come forward in the first place, you might not even be 
standing there convicted. But because they honored this code of silence, you are 
now suffering the consequences. 
These cumulative statements, combined with the fact that the Court was aware or should 
have been aware that Defendant could not pay restitution until his release, together 
indicate that the trial court treated Defendant * 'worse" than it would have treated a non-
prisoner facing similar attempted assault charges. Cf. Houk, supra. 906 P.2d at 909. 
In addition, it is also apparent that the decision of the trial court was made with 
"hostility." Id. In addressing the Defendant in open court, the transcript evidences that 
the trial court judge addressed Defendant with "enmity" and "ill will." See Webster's 
Dictionary, supra. 208 (defining "hostility"). Examples of this include statements made 
by the judge such as, "[s]ure would have been a lot more simple if they would have said 
that in the first place, hu?" as well as the judge's sardonic response of "Um-hmm" to 
Defendant's explanation of the circumstances of the offense (S. Tr. at 14). With such 
animosity openly displayed to Defendant in the confines of a courtroom, it is apparent 
that the sentence imposed by the court was indeed entered with "hostility." Cf. Houk. 
supra. 906 P.2d at 909. 
B. No reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court 
judge at sentencing. 
A view held by a person may be considered reasonable if it is "fair, proper, just, 
moderate, [or] suitable under the circumstances." See Black's Law Dictionary 874 (abr. 
6th ed. 1991)(defming reasonable). 
As articulated above, the facts in the present case indicate that Despite its finding 
"that the defendant does not have the current ability to pay [restitution], at least, not while 
he's in custody," the trial court nonetheless ordered that if "Defendant pays $10,000 
restitution within the next six months, that he will not need to pay the remainder of the 
restitution." (S. Tr. at 15). Such a ruling is not "fair, proper, just, moderate, [or] suitable 
under the circumstances'YBlack's Law Dictionary, supra), particularly in light of 
Defendant's previous statements regarding the payment of restitution upon release—that 
"I'm able to pay it, but not until then, because I have no accesses of getting to my money 
from here" (C.P. Tr. at 13-14). Even with the help of "family members and from friends" 
who would be able to help him raise money "in the very near future," Defendant 
nonetheless indicated that at best the money could only be collected "within six months" 
of his release date (S. Tr. at 9, 13). By failing to fully consider defendant's 
circumstances and his statements regarding his present ability to pay, the Court adopted a 
view that "no reasonable person would take." See Gerrard, supra, 584 P.2d at 887. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT JUDGE COMMITTED AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
BY SENTENCING DEFENDANT TO SERVE A JAIL TERM TO RUN 
CONSECUTIVE TO HIS PRESENT PRISON TERM 
As stated in Schweitzer, supra, 943 P.2d at 651 (citing Peterson, supra, 681 P.2d at 1219), 
"[t]he imposition of a sentence 'rests entirely within the discretion of the [trial] court, 
within the limits prescribed by law.'" As a result, an appeals court must "'review the 
sentencing decisions of a trial court for abuse of discretion.'" Id- In addition, "a trial 
court may abuse its discretion in imposing a sentence without considering all the legally 
relevant factors." Id. (citing State v. Montoya, 929 P.2d 356, 358 (Utah App. 
1996)[hereinafter Montoya]). These "legally relevant factors" are listed in Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-401(4), which reads in pertinent part as follows: 
A court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and the 
history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant in determining whether 
to impose consecutive sentences. 
Cf. State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236, 244 (Utah 1995)(affirming the need for trial courts to 
consider the legal requirements of § 76-3-401(4) in determining whether to impose 
consecutive sentences); State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297, 1301-1302 (Utah 1993)(also 
affirming the need for trial courts to consider the legal requirements of § 76-3-401(4) in 
determining whether to impose consecutive sentences). 
The Defense now reviews the trial court's consideration of the legally relevant 
factors at the time of sentencing. 
A. The trial court judge imposed a sentence without considering all legally 
relevant factors 
At the time of sentencing, the Defendant attempted to review evidence regarding 
the circumstances surrounding his offense, and also attempted to review evidence 
regarding his rehabilitative needs. Specifically, Counsel for defendant read aloud to the 
court a statement by Mark O'Granado, a witness to the offense, who had submitted a 
handwritten version of the altercation to Adult Probation and Parol as part of the Pre-
sentence Investigation (S. Tr. at 8). Defendant himself also attempted to present his own 
account of the circumstances surrounding the offense to the court, and explain why Mr. 
O'Granado had only recently come forward. Defendant's statements were not considered 
by the trial court, however, but as indicated above were instead met with the sardonic 
retort of, "Um-hmm," along with the statement, "Sure would have been a lot more helpful 
if they would have said that in the first place, hu?" (S. Tr. at 14). 
In imposing its subsequent sentence, the Court did briefly engage in a self-declared 
"digression" regarding the "problems with" of State prison inmates, but did not make any 
further meaningful consideration of the circumstances surrounding the offense (S. Tr. at 
15). Nor did it consider the statements introduced by Defendant regarding his 
rehabilitative needs—the need for a release in the near future to begin restitution 
payments and the need to resume his education (S. Tr. at 10). As a result, by imposing a 
consecutive sentence after overtly disregarding these "legally relevant factors," the trial 
court committed an "abuse of discretion." See Montoya, supra, 929 P.2d at 358. 
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CONCLUSION 
On the basis of the foregoing, the Judgment, Sentence and Commitment of the 
Trial Court should be vacated, and this action remanded to the District Court for a new 
sentencing. 
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION 
The Defendant believes that oral argument would materially assist the Court in 
rendering a decision in this case. Moreover, because this claim addresses potential 
ambiguities contained in §§ 76-3-401(2) and 76-3-401(4) of the Utah Criminal Code, 
relating to the "appropriate[ness]" of concunrent sentences for State prison inmates who 
are charged with committing new crimes during the period of their incarceration, a 
published opinion might provide useful guidance to the bench and the bar. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on this 4 Day of May, 2000. 
BEAVER COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
VOM J. CHRISTIANSEN 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on this 4th day of May, 2000, two true and correct copies of the 
foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF were served on the person named below by U. S. mail, 
first class postage prepaid, and addressed as follows: 
J. Frederic Voros, Jr. 
Assistant Attorney General 
PO Box 140854 
SLC UT 84114-0854 
V»yt£/5?feifttt 
Yom. CHRISTIANSEN 
Attorney for Defendant 
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ADDENDUM 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2). 
The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively if the later 
offense is committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole unless the court 
finds and states on the record that consecutive sentencing would be inappropriate. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4). 
A court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and the history, 
character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant in determining whether to impose 
consecutive sentences. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4)(a)(i). 
When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition 
to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the defendant make restitution to 
victims of crime as provided in this subsection, or for conduct for which the defendant has agreed 
to make restitution as part of a plea agreement. For purposes of restitution, a victim has the 
meaning as defined in Subsection (l)(e). 
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